1947년 미 국무부가 작성한 기밀 보고서『미국의 대한(對韓) 정책 1834-1941』텍스트 버전

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Summary -iv- I. Opening of Korea 1 Pre-Civil War interest – Secretary Seward’s proposal to France – Consul at Shanghai authorized to negotiate commercial treaty – Mission of F. F. Low, American Minister to China, 1871 – Senate resolution 1878 – Shufeldt mission – Shufeldt treaty May 22, 1882.

II. Early American Policy 5 Shufeldt treaty proclaimed June 4, 1883 – American attitude toward Sino-Korean relationship – American attitude toward rivalry of the powers for control of Korea – Recall of American Naval attaché George C. Foulk – Increase of Chinese influence at Seoul – Reception of Korean Envoy by the United States – Secretary Bayard’s objection to American Minister at Seoul becoming foreign adviser to King of Korea – American recognition of China’s special position in Korea – Summary.

III. Sino-Japanese War 11 Sino-Japanese rivalry – American effort to preserve peace – Request by China for United States initiative – British invitation for joint intervention declined – United States tenders good offices to Japan – American neutrality – 5-power intervention to halt war and guarantee Korean independence declined by United States – Treaty of Shimonoseki April 17, 1895 – United States accepts Japan’s assurance on Korean independence – Political disturbance in Korea October 1895 – American position: no intervention in Korean internal affairs – Minister Sill’s letter of May 11, 1897 to Americans in Korea – Department’s instruction to Minister Allen November 19, 1897 – American position on Russo-Japanese rivalry in Korea – American policy toward Korea at the turn of the century – Korean request for international guarantee declined by United States – Revision of American-Korean treaty – American cooperation with other powers respecting Korea prior to Russo-Japanese War.

IV. Establishment of Japanese Protectorate 22 Russo-Japanese negotiations preceding the war – War declared February 10, 1904 – United States disinterested in Korean neutrality – Korean-Japanese agreements February 23, and August 22, 1904 – President Theodore Roosevelt’s attitude toward Korea – Taft-Katsura conversation July 27, 1905 – Withdrawal of American Minister from Seoul – Appeal of Korean Emperor to the United States – Secretary Root’s position – Japanese assurance on maintenance of “open door” in Korea – United States partially surrenders extraterritoriality in favor of Japan.

V. Annexation 29 Japanese control of governmental power in Korea before annexation – Annexation anticipated by Department of State – Treaty of annexation August 22, effective August 29, 1910 – Japanese declaration on extraterritoriality and trade with Korea – American reaction to annexation – Washington’s attempt to organize American-British-German joint representation to Japan concerning extraterritoriality – Japanese statements on missionary activity, property rights of Americans, and administration of justice in Korea – United States’ surrender of extraterritorial jurisdiction in Korea – Abolition of foreign settlements in Korea.

VI. Acceptance of the Status Quo 35 Senate resolution of 1916 – Korean “rebellion” 1919 – American attitude – Korean nationalists in Paris 1919 – Policy of the Harding administration – Korean nationalists at the Washington Arms Conference – American trade relations with Korea – Reduced United States share of Korean trade – American firms in Seoul in 1931 – Sale of last American mining concession to Japanese company 1939 – Shrine worship controversy beginning in 1932 – American position on missionary difficulties – Withdrawal of missionaries 1937-1940 – Summary.

Summary

American interest in opening Korea to trade was evident in some slight degree before the Civil War. It was not until 1882, however, that the United States signed a commercial treaty with Korea–the first Western power to do so.

At first the United States considered Korea to be an independent state in the Western sense of the term; in May 1889, however, the United States recognized that the King of Korea was “under some form of feudal subjection to the Chinese crown, except so far as concerns his intercourse with, and responsible relations towards, other powers.” By the Treaty of Shimonoseki, April 17, 1895, which ended the Sino-Japanese War, China recognized the independence of Korea. Korean independence, however, was only nominal, since the country was subject to “assistance” and “direction” from Japan after the Sino-Japanese War.

The United States refused to be drawn into the contest for control of Korea in which, to varying degrees, Japan, China, Great Britain, and Russia engaged after the opening of Korea to Western commerce. Although the United States sought to settle peaceably the Sino-Japanese controversy over Korea before the outbreak of the war in 1894, its efforts did not go beyond the tender of good offices. The United States declined a British proposal in 1894 to join with other powers in guaranteeing Korean independence and rejected the request of the Korean Monarch in 1899 that the United States take the initiative in obtaining from the powers a guarantee of Korean integrity.

The United States maintained diplomatic relations with Korea for twenty-two years (1883-1905). When Japan established a formal protectorate over Korea in 1905 the American Legation at Seoul was immediately withdrawn at Japanese request.

When Japan annexed Korea in 1910 the United States raised no objection. As Japan coupled its announcement of annexation with a declaration that the existing tariff provisions governing trade with Korea would be retained for a period of ten years, American trade was not immediately affected. The Japanese gave assurances that continued American missionary activity in Korea would be permitted and that American property rights in the Peninsula would be respected.

Although Great Britain and France publicly announced their surrender of extraterritoriality in Korea following the annexation, the United States gave up extraterritorial jurisdiction in Korea without making a formal declaration to that effect. Between World War I and World War II the United States gave no encouragement to the Korean nationalist movement which sought the reestablishment of an independent state. Actually the United States rebuffed Korean leaders who attempted to obtain a hearing for their cause at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and at the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armaments in 1921-22. From the end of the first World War until 1941 American commercial and missionary interests were in constant retreat from Korea in the face of Japanese pressure, which was unopposed by the American Government.

I. Opening of Korea

Initial American interest in Korea in the period before the Civil War was connected with the expansion of American trade in the Far East and more particularly with the opening of Japan to Western commerce. Upon his return from the Orient Edmund Roberts reported to the Secretary of State on May 13, 1834, that one of the advantages of opening Japan was the possibility that this would lead to trade with Korea. A resolution introduced into the House of Representatives on February 15, 1845 called for a mission to both countries to open them to trade and stated that while “we cannot expect anything like equal advantages from intercourse with Corea, it seems desirable to include that country along with Japan as negotiations may be despatched with little additional expense by the same ambassador.” The resolution failed to pass. Perry opened Japan in 1853-54 but nothing further appears to have been done respecting Korea at that time.

In the post-Civil War period the United States renewed its efforts to open Korea to American trade. In January 1867 Secretary of State Seward learned that the American trading schooner General Sherman had been burned in Korean waters in August 1866 and Americans on board put to death; also that French naval vessels had gone to Korea to investigate the massacre of some French missionaries which had taken place early in 1866. On February 26, 1867 Seward received word from the American Minister in Peking that the French Chargé had informed China that France proposed to “march to the conquest of Korea” and would establish a protectorate over the peninsula.

Secretary Seward, who believed in cooperating with the European powers in the Far East, in a conversation with the French Minister in Washington on March 2, 1867 proposed that the two powers unite in a joint expedition to Korea to secure satisfaction for the murder of the Frenchmen and the Americans. This is the first instance where the United States, in the 19th century, was willing to act in conjunction with another nation in dealing with Korea. By this action Secretary Seward also expected to establish commercial relations between the United States and Korea.

On learning from George F. Seward, the American Consul General at Shanghai, that Korea was willing to establish trade relations, the Secretary of State authorized Mr. Seward on June 27, 1868 to proceed to Korea to negotiate a commercial treaty. When this instruction was received it was discovered that conditions were unfavorable to the success of a mission, therefore Mr. Seward did not undertake it.

A further effort to open Korea was initiated two years later. In April 1870 Frederick F. Low, the American Minister to China, was instructed to go to Korea, accompanied by some ships of the American Navy on Asiatic station, and to negotiate a “shipwreck” convention as well as a commercial treaty. Although “not sanguine” about the success of the proposed expedition, Mr. Low sought the assistance of the Chinese Government in laying the groundwork for the venture. Mr. Low’s attempts to negotiate with the Korean authorities in May and June 1871 were unsuccessful. While some of the vessels of the expedition were engaged in exploring the passage between the mainland and an off-shore island they were fired upon by Korean shore batteries. Correspondence with the local Korean authorities in explanation of this incident was not deemed satisfactory. Thereupon the American expedition retaliated. It subdued the offending forts, took some Korean prisoners, and withdrew from Korean waters.

In the years immediately following the failure of the Low expedition the United States made no attempt to enter into treaty relations with Korea. American interest in Korea, however, did not abate. In April 1878 Senator A. A. Sargent introduced a joint resolution authorizing the President to appoint a commission to negotiate a treaty with Korea “with the aid of the friendly offices of Japan.” This resolution, however, was never adopted. Later in the same year Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt was sent on a commercial and diplomatic mission to unfrequented parts of Africa and Asia, including Korea. In April and May 1880 Shufeldt’s attempts, with the assistance of the good offices of Japan, to enter into negotiations with the Korean authorities, were unsuccessful.

In the summer of 1880 Li Hung-chang, the Chinese Viceroy at Tientsin, assured Shufeldt that he would use his good offices to induce the Korean Government to enter into treaty relations with the United States. Thereupon Shufeldt returned to the United States. Shufeldt was back in China in the summer of 1881, on special duty at the American Legation in Peking, but with headquarters in Tientsin. The actual treaty negotiations took place in Tientsin in the spring of 1882 between the Chinese Viceroy and Commodore Shufeldt. The former wanted to include the phrase “Chosen [Korea] being a dependent state of the Chinese Empire”, which the latter would not accept. A compromise was reached in which Shufeldt agreed to transmit to the American President a letter from the King of Korea stating that the treaty had been made by consent of the Chinese Government. The treaty, as drawn up in Tientsin, was signed in Korea by Korean Commissioners and Commodore Shufeldt on May 22, 1882.

Thus after fifteen years of effort, in the course of which the United States first sought to achieve its goal in conjunction with France, then used the direct approach to Korea, followed by appeal to the good offices of Japan and of China in turn, the United States finally succeeded in establishing commercial relations with that Far Eastern Kingdom.

II. Early American Policy

The United States was the first Western power to sign a treaty with Korea. Other Western powers used the American instrument as a model when signing their first treaties with Korea in the years immediately following 1882. The United States Senate consented to the treaty on January 9, 1883, ratifications were exchanged in Seoul on May 19, 1883 and the treaty was proclaimed by the President on June 4, 1883.

From the very beginning of its treaty relations with Korea, the United States attempted to straddle the most important political issue, i.e. the exact relationship existing between Korea and China. At the same time that the United States was dealing with this question, other powers, particularly Japan, Russia, and Great Britain, were attempting to establish some sort of control over the Peninsula.

Basically the United States considered Korea to be an independent state. In instructions to the first American Minister to Korea, before his departure for Seoul, the Secretary of State wrote: “As far as we are concerned, Corea is an independent sovereign power, with all the attendant rights, privileges, duties and responsibilities; in her relations to China we have no desire to interfere unless action should be taken prejudicial to the rights of the United States …” This same position was asserted subsequently when the Secretary of State wrote to the American Minister at Seoul on January 26, 1888: “Therefore as the United States have no privity with the inter-relations of China and Corea, we shall treat both as separate governments customarily represented here by their respective and independent agents.”

The United States tried to steer a middle course when confronted with the ambitions of other powers on the Korean scene. When the American Chargé reported in June 1885 that he had suggested to the Japanese and Chinese representatives in Seoul that their troops remain on Korean soil in view of the possibility of Anglo-Russian hostilities in Korea, the Secretary of State reminded him “that very great discretion is necessary in making such intimations to the Chinese and Japanese representatives. The Government of the United States has no concern in these matters beyond that of a friendly State which has treated with Corea as independent and sovereign and hopes to see her position as such among nations assured.”

The following day the Secretary of State explained the American position in greater detail: “Seoul is the centre of conflicting and almost hostile intrigues involving the interests of China, Japan, Russia and England. It is clearly the interest of the United States to hold aloof from all this and do nothing nor be drawn into anything which would look like taking sides with any of the contestants, or entering the lists of intrigue for our own benefit. The United States can take no action which might even in appearance seem to favor or oppose the policy of either China or Japan, without impairing the position of friendly impartiality towards all which it is the duty and pleasure of this nation to maintain.”

Some years later the Department reiterated the same position in an instruction to the Minister in Korea: “You will continue in your present attitude, avoiding entanglement in the engagements and disputes between Korea and Foreign Powers, and directing your efforts mainly to ensuring the participation of American citizens in all legitimate residential and commercial rights, now or hereafter, to be conceded by Korea.”

During the greater part of 1885 and 1886 the United States was represented at Seoul by the Naval Attaché, George C. Foulk, who served as Chargé d’Affaires ad interim in the absence of the Minister Resident. The Chargé attempted to carry out the policy of his Government, which considered Korea as an independent state. At this same time China was attempting to strengthen its suzerainty over Korea, and sent Yuan Shi-kai to Seoul as Chinese Resident in the fall of 1885. As was to be expected, considerable friction soon developed between the American Chargé and the Chinese Resident. The Chinese Government in June 1887, officially requested the recall of Foulk, and the United States acquiesced immediately. Whether such acquiescence was tantamount to recognition of Chinese suzerainty is open to question. In Korea, however, it was regarded as a victory for China.

Following this episode the United States began to reconsider its position. It watched the development of Chinese influence at Seoul and made preparation for meeting a new situation, should it arise. On July 27, 1887, the Secretary of State wrote to the American Minister to Korea: “If, contrary to the expectations of this Government, the progress of Chinese interference at Seoul should result in the destruction of the autonomy of Corea as a sovereign state with which the United States maintain independent treaty relations, it will be time then to consider whether this Government is to look to that of China to enforce treaty obligations for the protection of the persons and interests of citizens of the United States, and their commerce, in Korean territory as a dependency of China.”

In the fall of 1887, the Chinese Government sought to prevent the departure of the Korean Envoy to the United States, on the ground that Korea was a dependency of China. The United States immediately expressed its “surprise and regret” at this action of the Chinese Government, and followed this up by a statement that heretofore China had disclaimed any international responsibility for the acts of Korea. In the end the Korean Envoy was received by the United States in January 1888, without the intervention of the Chinese Minister on a footing of diplomatic equality with the representatives of other States which maintain treaty relations with the United States.” The Secretary of State outlined the American position on the subject to the American Minister in China as follows: “The position of the United States is that of simply requiring the observance of treaty obligations, and it is not thought expedient to pursue any controversy as to the relations of China and Corea, further than may be necessary to enable us to secure such observance. The interest of this Government is not political. It seeks merely the protection of American citizens and their commerce, and is not disposed to go beyond the point where such protection can be obtained.”

Early in 1888, the American Minister at Seoul, Hugh A. Dinsmore, reported that he had the opportunity to become foreign adviser to the King of Korea, and requested the views of the Secretary of State respecting his resignation from the American service to accept this offer. The latter frowned upon such a move on the ground that it would be difficult for the Minister’s successor to conduct the business of the Legation if Dinsmore were a foreign adviser and continued: “In addition … it is to be borne in mind that this Government has been informed by the Imperial Government of China that they claim suzerainty over Corea and it certainly would be considered a disregard by the United States of the Chinese claim, if we consented to our representative leaving our service in order to assume the position of advisor to the Corean Government.”

From this statement it appears that the United States, in governing the actions of its representative in Korea, was disposed in fact to recognize Chinese suzerainty. In any case, the statement would indicate that the United States was not too sure of its position on Korean independence. The following year the United States went even further in recognizing China’s special position in Korea. In discussing the status of the Chinese Resident at Seoul, the Secretary of State wrote: “The repeated announcements which have been made to this Government from time to time, touching the relation of Corea to China in regard to internal matters, leave no doubt that the King of Korea is under some form of feudal subjection to the Chinese crown, except so far as concerns his intercourse with, and responsible relations towards, other powers.”

This same position was reasserted in 1890 in an instruction to the American Minister at Seoul: “Our treaty relations with Corea unquestionably give us the right to look to that kingdom as to a responsible government, for the fulfillment of all obligations of international intercourse, independently of China. The treaty was negotiated to that express end, with the sanction and, indeed, under the initiative of China … With the reserved relation of Corea to China we cannot properly interfere to raise any question, unless the course of China should be such as to manifestly shift accountability as regards foreign interests and intercourse to the shoulders of China.”

From the above account of the American attitude towards Korea, one thing stands out. The United States considered Korea as an independent state for the purposes of fulfilling treaty obligations, but would do little to assist Korea in resisting Chinese interference in the direction of Korean foreign affairs. Furthermore, the United States would not take sides in the Anglo-Russian rivalry for control of Korea nor help Korea in her struggle with these two powers. By maintaining its impartial attitude and considering Korea to be an independent state, the United States, in practice, was supporting the Japanese position, which, since the Korean-Japanese treaty of 1876, was that Korea was in fact free from all control by China. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 solved the problem of Korea’s relationship to China. It established Korea as a state independent of China in the Western sense.

III. Sino-Japanese War

When Sino-Japanese rivalry for control of Korea came to a climax in 1894, the United States played a very minor role in the attempt to settle the controversy by peaceful means. On two previous occasions, in 1882 and 1884, China and Japan were on the verge of war because of Korea, but each time the two powers compromised their differences without resort to arms. By 1894, however, Japan was ready to challenge by force of arms the Chinese claim of suzerainty over Korea.

When the United States learned that Chinese and Japanese troops were facing each other in Korea, it instructed its Minister in Seoul on June 22, 1894 “to use every possible effort” to preserve peace. Acting on this instruction, the American Minister joined with his British, French, and Russian colleagues in addressing a joint note to the Chinese and Japanese representatives requesting the simultaneous withdrawal of their troops from Korea.

Korea repeatedly requested American cooperation in adjusting the controversy. China on July 7, 1894 asked that the United States take the initiative in urging the powers to unite in requesting Japan to withdraw its troops from Korea. The United States, however, while desiring to see Korean sovereignty “respected” would go no further than exerting its influence on Japan “only in a friendly way.” The United States tendered its good offices to Japan. In a conversation with the Japanese Minister in Washington early in July the Secretary of State requested Japan “to deal kindly and fairly with her feeble neighbor.” This position was stated in stronger terms in a telegraphic communication of July 7, 1894 to the American Minister in Tokyo who was instructed to say to the Japanese Government “that the President will be painfully disappointed should Japan visit upon her feeble and defenceless neighbor the horrors of an unjust war.”

When Great Britain inquired on July 8 whether the United States would unite with it in an intervention to avert war between Japan and China, the United States replied that it “could not join another power even in a friendly intervention.” The Korean and Chinese Ministers in Washington were also informed that the United States could not go beyond the tender of good offices to Japan, and that the United States “could not unite with other powers in any kind of an intervention.” When the Chinese Envoy asked whether the American Secretary of State could offer any suggestion to avoid war, the latter replied that China should offer to settle the controversy by friendly arbitration. Thus, while the United States stood for peace, it would do nothing which might possibly result in its having to assume responsibility for settlement of the dispute.

During the course of the war the United States maintained absolute and impartial neutrality. In October 1894 the British Government inquired whether the United States would join with England, Germany, Russia, and France, in intervening between China and Japan. The basis of such intervention “would be that the independence of Korea should be guaranteed by the powers and that Japan should receive an indemnity for the expense of the war.” The American Secretary of State replied that while the President “earnestly desires that China and Japan shall speedily agree upon terms of peace alike honorable to both and not humiliating to Korea, he can not join” in the requested intervention.

In November the United States tendered its good offices to both China and Japan to bring the war to a close. China was agreeable, but Japan replied that China should approach Japan through the American Legation at Peking. Following direct negotiations China and Japan signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki on April 17, 1895, by which China recognized Korean independence; and ratifications were exchanged on May 8, 1895.

Korea was now independent of China, but subject to “direction” and “assistance” from Japan. This change in Korea’s masters did not require a change in policy. American policy still was: no interference in internal affairs, and no cooperation with other powers. The United States accepted at face value Japan’s assurance regarding the maintenance of Korean independence, but refused to recognize that Korean independence dated only from June 6, 1895. The Department of State informed the American Minister to Korea on July 9, 1895 as follows: “The position assumed by this Government towards Korea since contracting a treaty with it in 1882 has in no wise been affected by recent events. Korea’s treaty independence since then has been for us an established and accepted fact.”

When, in October 1895, a Japanese-inspired revolt at Seoul resulted in the deposition of the King and the murder of the Queen, and the American Minister subsequently joined with representatives of England, Russia, and France in urging the Japanese to restore the King, the Secretary of State telegraphed the American Minister on November 11, 1895: “Intervention in political concerns of Korea is not among your functions and is forbidden by diplomatic instruction 64.” When the Department of State received the despatches from the American Legation at Seoul describing the action taken by the American representatives there, in connection with the political disturbance, the Secretary of State instructed the American Minister by telegram on November 20, 1895: “Confine yourself strictly [to] protection of American citizens and interests. You have no concern in internal affairs. Your actions to be taken independently of other representatives unless otherwise instructed.” The next day the Secretary of State wrote at greater length:

“While our representative may, and should whenever the opportunity arises, but always acting independently of other powers, give to the Government to which he is accredited, when his advice is sought, such friendly cousel as he, in his judgment, deems most conducive to the welfare and prosperity of the sovereign and his people, it is nowise his function, unless acting under instructions from this Department, to take action with the representatives of other treaty powers in calling the Government to account or in any way mixing himself up with the internal affairs of the country.”

Instructions not to interfere in the Korean political situation were telegraphed subsequently to the American Minister at Seoul on December 2, 1895 and January 10, 1896. Finally on January 11, 1896 the Secretary of State wrote the American Minister to caution all Americans in Korea not to express any anti-Japanese opinions: “You should inform all Americans resident in Korea that they should strictly refrain from any expression of opinion, or from giving advice concerning the internal management of the country, or from any intermeddling in political questions; that if they do so it is at their own risk and peril; that neither you nor the Government of the United States can approve of such action on their part or perhaps be able to adequately protect them should they disregard this advice. They should strictly confine themselves to their missionary work, whether it be teaching in schools, preaching the gospel, or attending to the sick, for which they went to the country.” Upon further prodding by the Department of State the following year, the American Minister notified all Americans on May 11, 1897, of the non-interference policy of the American government.

The United States almost “bent over backwards” in carrying out its policy of non-interference in Korean internal affairs. Writing in November 1897 to Horace N. Allen, who had been raised from Secretary of the Legation at Seoul to the post of American Minister on July 17, 1897, the Secretary of State observed: “… in view of past occasions when it has been deemed necessary for the Department to take cognizance of indiscreet acts or partizan utterances of the representatives of the United States at Seoul, it behooves me to enjoin upon you the most absolute reserve and prudence, and abstention from any influence, advice or suggestion in any quarter, however urgently you may be invited. Even your inquiries touching the situation with a view to reporting facts to this Government should be discreetly guarded, so that no undue interest in the case can be imputed to you.”

The Sino-Japanese War did not bring about a cessation of the contest by the powers for control of Korea. Russia took China’s place as the principal contender vis-à-vis Japan. In the developing contest the United States, although maintaining a neutral position, appeared inclined to sympathize with the Japanese. In February 1896 the Secretary of State queried the American Minister at Seoul by telegraph: “Is Russia practically governing the country through the King and abolishing reforms instituted by Japan?” In the following year the Department telegraphed its representative in Korea: “Japanese Government complains you and Secretary of Legation assisting Russian Minister in matter not concerning United States.”

In connection with the growing Russian influence in Korea, the Secretary of State outlined American policy in an instruction to the newly-elevated American Minister: “You have been appointed to this interesting mission at a time when there is reason to believe that rival purposes and interests in the east may find in Korea a convenient ground of contention, and it behooves the United States and their representatives, as absolutely neutral parties, to say or do nothing that can in any way be construed as taking sides with or against any of the interested powers. Any such partiality would not only be in itself improper, but might have the undesirable and unfortunate effect of leading the Koreans themselves to regard the United States as their natural and only ally for any and all such purposes of domestic policy as Korea’s rulers may adopt.”

This same instruction also emphasized the observance of absolute neutrality by American representatives on questions involving the relations of Korea to other powers. Some years later, when the American Minister reported his actions in support of American interests the Department repeated its admonitions, as follows: “While the Department recognizes the possible necessity of a certain personal influence at the Korean court, having in view the interests of American citizens as affected by collateral incidents, it should not be overlooked that interference even though non-official, in the affairs of other nations in their relations with Korea involves a certain departure from our traditional methods of diplomacy and from our present policy among foreign peoples.”

By the turn of the century the United States had a territorial stake in the Orient, having acquired sovereignty over the Philippine Islands. But American policy toward Korea continued to reflect the mild interest with which the United States watched developments in the Peninsula. The Hay “Open Door” notes to the powers, dealing with equal commercial opportunity in China, made no mention of a similar self-denying statement with respect to Korea.

In 1899, the Korean Emperor, through the American Minister, Horace N. Allen, requested that the United States take the initiative in obtaining from the powers an agreement guaranteeing the integrity of Korea. While in the United States on leave in 1899 Allen mentioned the matter to President McKinley and Secretary of State Hay, and was told to make a negative reply to the Korean Emperor. In October 1900, the Korean Minister to Japan requested the American Minister in Tokyo to urge upon the American Government to take the initiative to secure, in cooperation with all the great powers, an international guarantee of the independence and neutrality of Korea, similar to that enjoyed by Switzerland. The reply of the American Minister in Tokyo, that it would not be proper for him to make such a recommendation and that such a proposition should be submitted to the United States Government through the Korean Minister in Washington, was approved by Secretary Hay. The American position concerning an international guarantee for Korea had not changed since the Sino-Japanese War.

For a brief period, prior to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, American interest in Korea revived. In July 1902 Minister Allen was instructed to invite revision of the United States-Korean treaty “with a view to securing ampler privileges in the line of the advance of Oriental sentiment during the [last] twenty years.” Korea was to give to the United States no less privileges “than her neighbors have done, or than she may accord to the subjects of any other power.” When Minister Allen reported that he was unsuccessful in opening negotiations for treaty revision, he was instructed to allow the matter to rest.

In this same period, the United States appeared to be veering in the direction of a policy of joint action with other powers in Korean matters, possibly because of the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance on January 30, 1902. When the American Minister reported that Americans, like other foreigners in Korea, were having difficulty in obtaining title deeds to property, and that he could get no satisfaction on the subject from the Korean Foreign Office, the Department of State instructed Minister Allen to “concurrently with the representatives of other powers, insist upon the observance of the treaty.”

Following the signature of the Chinese-American Commercial Agreement of October 8, 1903, in which China agreed to open the port of Antung on the Yalu River, the Secretary of State instructed the American Chargé at Seoul by telegraph on November 7, 1903, to confer with the British and Japanese representatives regarding the opening, on the same conditions as other treaty ports, of Wiju, on the Korean side of the Yalu, in the vicinity of Antung. This was confirmed a few days later as follows: “You are therefore instructed to confer fully with the British and Japanese representatives, and bearing always in mind the purely commercial nature of the interests of the United States in this matter, to urge on the Korean Government the early opening of Wiju to international trade as of equal advantage to Korean trade and to that of the world.”

It soon developed, however, that the British and Japanese representatives were urging the opening of Yongampho farther downstream, to which the Russian representative at Seoul was strongly opposed. Because of this development, the Secretary of State wrote: “… in view of the policy of this Government not to take, in the furthering of its commercial interests, any step which might be construed as joint action for the advancement of the political purposes of any Power or group of Powers, we can only, at the present time, express the pleasure which we would have in seeing Yongampho open to foreign trade; but the representations of this Government must be confined to securing from the Korean Government the opening of Wiju.” This attempt at joint action with Japan and Great Britain, on the very eve of the Russo-Japanese War, marks the high point of American cooperative action regarding Korea. With the coming of the Russo-Japanese War, the United States inclined to favor Japanese control of Korea as against Russian control.

IV. Establishment of Japanese Protectorate

Russo-Japanese rivalry for control of Manchuria and Korea was a disturbing factor in Far Eastern politics. In July 1903 Japan opened negotiations with Russia for a political settlement. The American Minister in Tokyo reported that Japan would suggest that it “recognize the rights already possessed by Russia in Manchuria, based on treaties or conventions now published, and in return that Russia recognize that in Korea Japan is interested in a peculiar degree politically as well as commercially and industrially.” Russia’s counter-proposal contained a provision for creating a neutral zone in Korea north of the thirty-ninth parallel into which neither Japan nor Russia were to introduce troops. Japan at first was agreeable to the establishment of this neutral zone, provided “a similar zone of equal extent be created in Manchuria along the Korea-Manchuria frontier.” Russia desired to exclude Manchuria from the proposed settlement, and make it applicable only to Korea. In the course of the negotiations Japan refused to agree to the establishment of a neutral zone in Korea north of the thirty-ninth parallel, and insisted that Manchuria be included in the settlement. Negotiations were stalemated and Japan’s patience was exhausted. Diplomatic relations were severed by Japan on February 6, 1904 and on the 10th the two countries went to war.

During this exchange of views Japan kept the United States fully informed on the progress of the negotiations. From the very beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, the United States showed a lack of interest in what happened to Korea. When war appeared imminent, the United States circularized the European powers signatory of the Protocol of Peking and requested them to cooperate with the United States in inducing Russia and Japan to respect the neutrality and administrative entity of China. It is significant that no specific mention was made of neutrality for Korea. When the American Minister at Seoul cabled that a new Japanese-Korean agreement was being prepared, the Secretary of State replied: “Not necessary to cable text of Japan-Korea agreement. You will observe absolute neutrality.” On February 26, 1904 the Japanese Minister in Washington, on instructions from Tokyo, left with the Secretary of State the text of the protocol between Japan and Korea, signed at Seoul on the 23rd. This agreement established a Japanese protectorate in fact, and had the effect of making Korea a belligerent on the side of Japan, inasmuch as it permitted Japan to occupy “when circumstances require it, such places as may be necessary from strategic points of view.” It also stipulated that the two countries “shall not in [the] future, without mutual consent, conclude with a third power such an arrangement as may be contrary to the principles of the present protocol.”

The following August, another agreement was concluded between the two countries by which Korea engaged to accept a financial adviser and a diplomatic adviser recommended by the Japanese Government. Korea also was to “consult” Japan before concluding treaties with foreign powers or granting concessions to foreigners. In communicating this agreement to the Department of State the Japanese Minister in Washington stated that it did not “interfere with the full operation or validity of Korea’s existing treaties,” and that it was not intended “to place any impediment in the way of legitimate enterprise in Korea.” The Department accepted these assurances without question.

The United States was prepared early in 1905 to wash its hands completely of Korea. President Theodore Roosevelt wrote to Secretary Hay on January 28, 1905: “We cannot possibly interfere for the Koreans against Japan. They could not strike one blow in their own defence.” And to the American Ambassador to Italy, who was soon to be transferred to Moscow, the President wrote a few days later: “Japan ought to have a protectorate over Korea (which has shown its utter inability to stand by itself) while I should hope to see Manchuria restored to China.” American policy, judging from this correspondence, was well established prior to the Taft-Katsura conversation in Tokyo on July 27, 1905. In this conversation Japan disclaimed any aggressive designs on the Philippine Islands. The United States, in turn, indicated that it had no objections to the establishment of a Japanese protectorate over Korea. As far as the United States was concerned, Japan was to have a free hand in Korea. It should be emphasized, however, that this quid pro quo involved no change of existing American policy.

Fortified by the American, British, and Russian commitments giving it a free hand in Korea, Japan was ready for the establishment of a formal protectorate. By an agreement between the two countries, dated November 17, 1905, Japan took over the direction and administration of Korean foreign affairs. The day following notification by the Japanese Minister in Washington of the existence of this agreement, the United States on November 24, 1905, telegraphed its Minister in Seoul to close the Legation and withdraw from Korea. The American Minister complied on November 28. The Korean Legation in Washington was similarly closed on December 16, 1905. The Korean Monarch appealed to the United States under the good offices clause of the Korean-American treaty of May 22, 1882, maintaining that duress was employed by Japan in securing the agreement of November 17, 1905. The United States, however, would not interfere. The Secretary of State pointed to the “treaties” between Korea and Japan, dated February 23, 1904 and August 22, 1904, which had not been questioned, and concluded that these two “treaties between Japan and Korea appear to be of such a character as practically to give Japan control over the foreign relations of Korea, and to make the latest treaty of November 17, 1905, which is now called in question, but a slight advance upon the relations of control previously existing. Those previous relations of control amount to a complete bar to any interference by the United States under the treaty of 1883 [sic].”

During the approximately five years between the formal establishment of the protectorate and the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910, no serious dispute developed between the United States and Japan. In February 1906 Marquis Ito assured the American Chargé d’Affaires ad interim in Tokyo that Japan would maintain the “open door” in Korea. In March 1906 the United States wanted to style the American representative in Seoul as “agent and consul general”. Japan refused this request on the ground that all diplomatic business regarding Korea was transacted in Tokyo and nothing more was said on the subject. By a treaty signed on May 19, 1908 between the United States and Japan, providing for the protection of trade-marks, copyrights, etc., in Korea, the United States surrendered its extraterritorial jurisdiction in favor of Japan in case American citizens infringed the provisions of the treaty. This partial surrender of jurisdiction was appreciated in Japan “as an expression of America’s good will toward Japan and of sympathy with the latter in the difficult task of administering her protectorate.” By 1907 it was generally recognized by American diplomatic officials that Japan was in Korea to stay. Furthermore, as far as the United States was concerned, the question of Korean independence was a closed issue.

V. Annexation

Japanese annexation of Korea came as no surprise to anyone. The subject had been discussed in the Japanese press early in 1910. By a series of agreements between Korea and Japan practically all real governmental powers in Korea had been transferred to Japan by the middle of 1910. The Department of State was preparing for annexation before it was announced. Mr. Ransford S. Miller of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs indicated in a memorandum dated June 23, 1910 that American interests in Korea could be divided into four categories: Extraterritorial jurisdiction, customs tariff, mining concessions, and educational (missionary) enterprises. The memorandum intimated that the last two-named categories would not be affected by Japanese annexation. He also suggested that surrender of extraterritoriality be used as a bargaining factor for favorable consideration of American trade should the tariff schedule be changed.

On August 24, 1910 the Japanese Ambassador in Washington handed to Huntington Wilson, the Acting Secretary of State, an English translation of the treaty annexing Korea to Japan, signed in Seoul on August 22, 1910 together with the declaration of the Japanese Government relating to foreigners and foreign trade in Korea. The declaration stated that the effective date of annexation would be August 29, 1910. It announced that the existing tariff schedule would be retained for ten years from date of annexation and that this tariff would be applied to Japanese trade with Korea on the same basis as to the trade between foreign powers and Korea. It also declared that extraterritoriality in Korea was abolished, except for cases pending in the respective consular courts at the time annexation took effect.

To the above communication, the Acting Secretary of State whose “impression” was “to make no protest,” replied on September 17, 1910: “While I am constrained by the great importance of the interests of American citizens in Korea to make all necessary reservations as to their rights and privileges, I beg to inform your excellency that the Government of the United States is gratified to note the assurances already given by the Imperial Japanese Government concerning matters relating to foreigners and foreign trade in Korea.”

The United States was not quite ready to surrender American interests in Korea at the behest of Japan. On the one hand, it sought clarification from Tokyo regarding provisions for administering justice for American citizens, recognition of title to property held by Americans, disposition of foreign settlements, and attitude toward American missionary enterprise; on the other hand, it sounded out Great Britain and Germany on the possibility of a joint representation to Japan concerning arrangements to be made for handling cases involving foreigners before surrendering extraterritoriality. London, having already stated the terms on which it was willing to surrender jurisdiction, could not take part in a joint representation. Berlin was willing to participate in such action provided “there should be agreement among the Powers mainly interested, especially Great Britain and France.” The United States, therefore, was left to act by itself.

In the course of the negotiations, the Japanese Government stated in October 1910 that it would maintain the status quo of the foreign settlements for the time being. Concerning missionary activity, the Japanese Government wrote that it had “no intention to depart in Korea from their established policy of extending due protection and encouragement to all religious missions engaged in educational and other commendable enterprises not prejudicial to the Government and administration.” Regarding property rights, the Japanese Government declared in January 1911 that land titles would be respected and that consular registration of such titles would be “treated as prima facie valid.” As regards surrender of American consular jurisdiction, the Japanese Government in February 1911 stated that “in any case where an American citizen is charged with a criminal offense in any part of Chosen [Korea] the governor general… will order, at the request of the accused, that the procedure against the latter be transferred to the proper court at Seoul having jurisdiction of the subject matter of the charge.”

The United States considered these assurances on land tenure and change of venue in criminal cases involving Americans as satisfactory, but before issuing definite instructions again exchanged views with the German Government on the subject. In the end no instructions were issued. In September 1911 the American Embassy in Tokyo was still without definite word from Washington regarding surrender of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Replying to a private citizen in March 1912, the Acting Secretary of State, Huntington Wilson, wrote: “In reply to your letter of the 22d relative to extraterritoriality in Korea, I beg to state that the American Government, like all other governments so far as known, has in principle and in practice recognized Japanese jurisdiction in Korea although no definite declaration to that effect has been deemed necessary.”

But in November 1915, in response to an inquiry regarding the “exact status of the treaty rights of American citizens” in Korea, the Department of State replied that these rights were defined in the United States-Japanese treaty of commerce and navigation signed on February 21, 1911. In August 1912, the Japanese Government took up the question of the abolition of the foreign settlements in the treaty ports of Korea. In conjunction with the other treaty powers, the United States readily consented to their abolition, which was effected on April 1, 1914. Japanese control over Korea was now complete.

VI. Acceptance of the Status Quo

There was a brief flicker of interest in Korea in the United States early in 1916 when the Senate adopted on February 21 a resolution requesting the correspondence relative to the Japanese occupation of the Peninsula. Secretary of State Lansing made a “judicious selection of the correspondence of record in order that nothing might be included which would be offensive to Japan or to Russia,” which was submitted by President Wilson to the Senate on February 23, 1916.

When the Korean nationalist movement was gaining momentum early in 1919 the American Consul General in Seoul reissued Minister Sill’s letter of May 11, 1897 and enjoined all Americans to abstain scrupulously from participation in the political affairs of the country. The Department of State immediately approved this action. When the nationalist movement brought about open resistance to Japanese authority in Korea, Tokyo was inclined to blame the Wilsonian doctrine of self-determination. The stand of the United States, however, was clearly outlined in an instruction to the American Ambassador in Japan, dated April 14, 1919: “The Consulate [at Seoul] should be extremely careful not to encourage any belief that the United States will assist the Korean nationalists in carrying out their plans and it should not do anything which may cause Japanese authorities to suspect American Government sympathizes with Korean nationalist movement.”

All appeals received during 1919 from Korean nationalist leaders in the United States for assistance and recognition of the “Republic of Korea” were filed by the Department of State without acknowledgment. While attempting to present their case to the Paris Peace Conference following the close of World War I, Korean leaders sought to obtain a hearing for their cause before the American Commissioners in Paris. In this they were unsuccessful. After the inauguration of President Warren G. Harding in March 1921 Korean nationalist leaders in the United States, on a number of occasions, attempted to present their plea for recognition to American officials. In each instance the plea was filed without acknowledgment on the ground that to do otherwise might be construed as recognizing Korean diplomatic representation in Washington, or giving encouragement to the Korean independence movement.

Korean nationalists endeavoured to have the American Delegation to the Washington Arms Conference (1921-1922) take up the question of Korean independence at the Conference. The American Delegation, however, ignored this plea. At the Washington Arms Conference the American Government was more concerned with having Japan restore Shantung Province to China and with getting the Japanese troops out of the Russian Far East than with the subject of Korean independence. In the post-World War I period, it appeared that Japan’s hold on Korea was not to be shaken, and that the United States would have no part in altering the existing order of things between Japan and Korea.

American trade relations with Korea were not immediately affected by Japanese annexation. Between the close of the Russo-Japanese War (1905) and World War I (1914) American exports to Korea averaged over $1,000,000 annually. During World War I American exports increased to $2,000,000 by 1917. The peak was reached in 1919 when $3,333,471 worth of American goods was exported to Korea. Between 1920 and 1924 the amount was just short of $3,000,000 annually, except for 1922 when the value of goods exported was $3,152,255. In 1925 American exports dropped to $1,664,948.

American imports from Korea were infinitesimal. From $3,045 in 1908 the amount increased to $245,551 in 1911, then dropped to a little over $8,000 in 1914 and 1915. The peak was reached in 1919 when $335,073 worth of goods was imported from Korea. From 1921 through 1925 the value of Korean products imported was stabilized in the vicinity of $50,000 annually. These export and import figures do not present an accurate picture of the trade between the two countries inasmuch as some of the trade was carried on by way of Japan. In any case, Korean trade was an insignificant part of the total foreign trade of the United States. A British source, treating Korean foreign trade in percentages, points out that 9.6% of Korean imports came from the United States in 1914; this dropped to 1.6% in 1929, and to 1.1% in 1935. For the same period the percentage of Korean exports to the United States dropped from 0.3% in 1914, to 0.1% in 1929, and to less than 0.1% in 1935. During this time Japan’s position in Korea’s external trade improved considerably.

The American Assistant Military Attaché in Tokyo, following a trip through Korea in September 1931, reported that there were only two American firms–Standard Oil Company and Singer Sewing Machine Company–remaining in Seoul. He pointed out that prior to annexation there had been many American business concerns there, but that Japanese restrictions on foreigners had forced them to withdraw. In October 1937 the American Consul General at Seoul reported that the trade opportunities for American products in the Korean market were rather limited, and that what importation existed was carried on through Japanese channels.

Prior to annexation, Americans held a number of mining concessions in Korea. After 1916 these concessions gradually passed into Japanese hands. In August 1939 the one remaining American concession, the Oriental Consolidated Mining Company, sold its holdings to the Nippon Mining Company (Nihon Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha), for $8,175,000. As in commercial activity, so in the mining field American interests, recognizing the odds against them, withdrew under Japanese pressure from Korea.

The rise of Japanese chauvinism in the years following the Manchurian “incident” of September 1931 indirectly affected American interests in Korea, because of the development of the shrine worship controversy, beginning in 1932, which involved the Japanese Government and American missionaries. The Japanese authorities required that all school personnel–principals, teachers, and students–attend ceremonies at Shinto shrines. The Japanese maintained that these ceremonies were in the nature of patriotic celebrations or national rites. Some of the American missionaries accepted this contention and met the Japanese requirement; others looked upon the shrine ceremonies as religious worship, hence a matter for their conscience.

The Department of State refused to be drawn into the controversy. It took the position that the Japanese were not violating any treaty, international agreement, or Japanese law by their requirement of compulsory attendance on the part of American missionaries at Shinto shrine ceremonies. In an instruction to the American Consul General at Seoul, dated September 11, 1937, the Department stated that the solution of the problem was one for the missionaries to work out with the Japanese Government. When the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church, in December 1939, appealed to the Department, saying that the forced attendance of missionaries at Shinto shrine ceremonies was embarrassing the mission work of the churches, it suggested that the matter be taken up with the Japanese Ambassador in Washington.

Because of the shrine worship controversy, some of the missionaries had already decided to withdraw from the secular education field in Korea and to turn the work over to native Korean organizations. In fact the Southern Presbyterians had closed their schools in September 1937, and the Northern Presbyterians had followed suit in 1938.

Japanese pressure considerably limited the field of operation for missionary work. As the situation in the Far East deteriorated, and as tension between the United States and Japan increased, the Department of State in the fall of 1940 suggested that all American citizens whose presence in the Far East was not absolutely essential withdraw to the United States. This suggestion came at an opportune time for American missionaries in Korea, inasmuch as their work was severely hampered by the attitude of Japanese officialdom in Korea toward continued missionary work there. Approximately 400 Americans, mostly missionaries, withdrew from Korea in the fall of 1940. As of June 20, 1941 there were 126 Caucasian Americans left in Korea, of which 109 were missionaries and their dependents. American influence in Korea was being gradually reduced to the vanishing point.

In the years following the annexation of Korea by Japan the American Government was in no position to take a strong stand on questions affecting Korea, in view of the fact that the United States had readily agreed to a formal Japanese protectorate over Korea in 1905 and had made no serious objections to annexation in 1910. But American involvement in World War II resulted in the complete abandonment of the Korean policy which had been pursued in the first four decades of the twentieth century.